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Abstract: When experiences become meaningful to the self, they are linked to synchronous activity in
a paralimbic network of self-awareness and dopaminergic activity. This network includes medial pre-
frontal and medial parietal/posterior cingulate cortices, where transcranial magnetic stimulation may
transiently impair self-awareness. Conversely, we hypothesize that dopaminergic stimulation may
improve self-awareness and metacognition (i.e., the ability of the brain to consciously monitor its own
cognitive processes). Here, we demonstrate improved noetic (conscious) metacognition by oral admin-
istration of 100 mg dopamine in minimal self-awareness. In a separate experiment with extended self-
awareness dopamine improved the retrieval accuracy of memories of self-judgment (autonoetic, i.e.,
explicitly self-conscious) metacognition. Concomitantly, magnetoencephalography (MEG) showed
increased amplitudes of oscillations (power) preferentially in the medial prefrontal cortex. Given that
electromagnetic activity in this region is instrumental in self-awareness, this explains the specific effect
of dopamine on explicit self-awareness and autonoetic metacognition. Hum Brain Mapp 36:1866–1877,
2015. VC 2015 TheAuthors Human Brain Mapping Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
During evolution, increasingly sophisticated brains
allow organisms to survive longer by learning from expe-
rience and predicting future events [Ingvar, 1985]. This
adaptability to internal and external events increases the
demand for selective resource allocation according to
needs. It raises the questions of how the brain controls its
own cognitive processes, how it learns from previous per-
sonal experiences, and how prediction of future events
occurs [Lou et al., 2011b]. Despite the fundamental signifi-
cance for human nature of self-monitoring and the devel-
opment of new strategies for treatment of its dysfunction
[Bechara, 2005; McNab et al., 2009; Rømer Thomsen et al.,
2013; Tang et al., 2010], its neurotransmitter regulation has
remained unknown.
Conscious self-monitoring, or metacognition, is depend-
ent on self-awareness [Frith, 2012]. Self-awareness comes
in two different categories: Minimal self-awareness and
extended self-awareness. Minimal self-awareness is
“consciousness of one-self as an immediate subject of
meaningful experience, unextended in time” [Gallagher,
2000]. Minimal self-awareness allows “noetic” (or
“conscious”) metacognition. When it is efficient, it implies
that the subjective experience of awareness is a predictor
of performance in tasks influenced by such experience. As
an example, we will demonstrate in Experiment 1 that sub-
jective experience of rapidly presented words is a predic-
tor of efficiency of identifying such words in a forced
choice paradigm [Metcalfe and Son, 2012]. Extended self-
awareness is “extended in time to include memories of the
past and intentions toward the future” [Gallagher, 2000].
Its basis is retrieval of personal memories which may have
different degrees of explicit self-reference or introspection
[Gallagher, 2000]. A high degree of introspection is equiva-
lent with “autonoetic” metacognition [Metcalfe and Son,
2012]. One way of quantifying autonoetic metacognition is
therefore to determine retrieval efficiency of episodic
memories with explicit self-reference.
In a previous positron emission experiment, the emer-
gence of meaningful conscious experience with minimal
self-awareness was directly linked to increased hemody-
namic activity in a paralimbic network. This network
includes medial prefrontal and medial parietal/posterior
cingulate (PCC) cortices as key cortical regions, together
with thalamus, and striatum [Kjaer et al., 2001]. The
increased paralimbic activity occurred when the appear-
ance of flickering stimuli was replaced by the appearance
of written words by prolonging the exposure time at the
expense of the number of exposures [Kjaer et al., 2001].
Later studies showed that the network is selective, active,
and instrumental in explicit self-awareness [Kjaer et al.,
2002b; Kwan et al., 2007; Lou et al., 2004; Luber et al.,
2012; Newen and Vogeley, 2003]. The interaction between
the major cortical regions depends on recurrent and
synchronized electromagnetic activity in the gamma range
(30–100 Hz) [Lou et al., 2011a] which is most pronounced
with a high degree of self-reference [Lou et al., 2010].
Circumstantial evidence has suggested that the neuro-
transmitter dopamine is closely linked to conscious experi-
ence [Kjaer et al., 2002a; Schmitt et al., 2006]. More
recently, we provided the first direct evidence that dopa-
mine regulates subjective conscious experience by showing
that dopamine stimulation enhances confidence and per-
formance when seeing rapidly presented words [Lou
et al., 2011c]. No previous studies have specifically exam-
ined the role of dopamine in the regulation of metacogni-
tion. With this aim, the present study investigated the
effect of dopaminergic stimulation in simple perceptual
awareness with noetic metacognition and in retrieval of
explicitly self-related judgment (autonoetic metacognition).
Two experiments were conducted: (1) A behavioral
study investigating the online effect of dopamine stimula-
tion on perception, subjective awareness and noetic meta-
cognitive capacity of visually presented words related to
one self or another person (Fig. 1) and (2) A combined
behavioral and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) study
investigating the effect of dopamine stimulation on
Figure 1.
Experimental design for minimal self-awareness task (visual identification). On each trial of
Experiment 1, participants had to identify a briefly presented (33ms) and masked trait adjective.
The participant was required to rate how aware they were of the stimuli on a perceptual aware-
ness scale. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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episodic retrieval of words related to one self (autonoetic
metacognition) or another person and on activity in the
paralimbic network (Fig. 2a).
In Experiment 1, the influence of dopaminergic stimu-
lation was examined by giving half of the participants
Sinemet (100 mg of the dopamine precursor L-DOPA
and 25 mg carbidopa), and the other half placebo in a
double blind experiment. Participants rated how well
trait adjectives described either themselves or a person
known to all participants (the Danish Queen) on a four-
point scale. Several days later they performed a visual
identification task (Fig. 1) and reported awareness of
perception using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS)
(Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004]. The task difficulty was
manipulated by altering the contrast of the stimuli
according to a 2-up-1 down staircase function. This
allowed for estimations of the impact of dopamine on
perceptual awareness (changes in the proportion of tri-
als on which awareness was reported), and objective
performance [Rounis et al., 2010].
In Experiment 2, a separate group of participants rated
how well adjectives described themselves and the Danish
Queen respectively, and again half of the participants
were given Sinemet and the other half placebo. In this
experiment, participants were subsequently asked to recol-
lect whether they had previously described an adjective as
fitting themselves (task 1: self) or the Queen (task 2: other).
A third, online, task without a memory component was
performed in which the participants counted the number
of syllables of each adjective presented online (task 3: syl-
lables) (Fig. 2a). This part permitted estimation of dopami-
nergic influence on self-awareness extended in time using
introspection (autonoetic metacognition, see Frith, 2012;
Metcalfe and Son, 2012]. Simultaneous MEG recordings
were used to investigate corresponding activity in the
main cortical regions of the paralimbic network; medial
prefrontal cortex, PCC, and a control region (right visual
area V1) (Fig. 2b). MEG offers a high temporal resolution
in combination with a decent spatial resolution even in
deeper cortical and paralimbic regions. However, the
Figure 2.
Experimental paradigm for extended self-awareness task. (a)
The participants first rated trait adjectives on how well they fit-
ted themselves (self-task) or the Danish Queen (other-task).
The encoding block was followed by a retrieval block, where
the same words were presented in a randomized order and the
participants responded whether the word was previously judged
fitting or not. In the third task the participants rated whether
the trait adjective had an even or odd number of syllables. (b)
Talairach coordinates used for MEG source extraction were:
medial prefrontal cortex (red): (x 5 0, y 5 42, z 5 54); PCC
(blue): (x 5 0, y 5 –50, z 5 28); V1 (green): (x 5 29, y 5 –96,
z 5 –6). Coordinates correspond to peak activities from a PET-
study investigating the paralimbic network [Lou et al., 2004].
The figure is modified from [Rømer Thomsen et al., 2013].
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spatial resolution declines with increased distance from
the sensors [Gross et al., 2003]. For this reason we did not
include measurements from the thalamus or striatum in
the present work.
METHODS
The study was conducted in accordance with the Decla-
ration of Helsinki and approved by the local ethics com-
mittee (De Videnskabsetiske Komiteer for Region
Midtjylland) and the Center for Functionally Integrative
Neuroscience Research Board.
Participants and Procedures
Experiment 1: Minimal self-awareness
Eighty right-handed young males, without a history of
diseases or drugs affecting the brain, participated in the
study. Only males were included as the female menstrual
cycle may influence the dopamine response.
The participants were randomly distributed to two age-
matched groups. One group of 40 persons was given pla-
cebo capsules containing starch only, and another group
of 40 persons was given capsules containing Sinemet (100
mg L-dopa mixed with 25 mg carbidopa to inhibit periph-
eral metabolism of L-dopa and minimize peripheral side
effects). This medication is commonly used to treat Parkin-
son’s disease. The capsules were visually identical and the
experiment was double-blinded: neither the participant
nor the experimenters were aware of the group. The phy-
sician administering the capsules was aware of the con-
tent, but was not involved in giving participant
instructions. This allowed for estimation of the impact of
dopamine on perceptual awareness.
Of the initial group of participants, three were excluded
prior to data inspection due to side effects from the Sinemet
(nausea), misunderstanding the task, or dyslexia. Upon data
inspection, three additional participants were excluded as
their staircase function used to regulate the task difficulty did
not converge (they had fewer than ten reversals). It was veri-
fied that the groups remained age-matched [t(72)521.1595, P
5 0.2501], with 36 persons remaining in the dopamine group
(mean age 23.4, SD 5 2.7) and 38 persons remaining in the
placebo group (mean age 24.2, SD5 3.2).
In the experiment, the participants had to detect a
briefly presented and masked trait adjective and select the
correct word among two possible answers (Fig. 1). Several
days prior to the study, participants rated how well each
of 377 trait adjectives (subset of Anderson, 1968] described
themselves and another person known to all participants:
the Danish Queen. This was done using a four-point scale
(1: does not match at all, 2: matches poorly, 3: matches rea-
sonably well, 4: matches absolutely). The experiment con-
sisted of two tasks, referred to as “self” and “other.” In
the self-task, the participant had to identify words previ-
ously described as fitting himself and in the other-task, the
participant had to identify words previously described as
fitting the Queen. Following the discrimination, the partici-
pant rated the level of awareness based on the four-point
Perception Awareness Scale (1: no perception of a word, 2:
a brief flash of a word, 3: an almost clear perception, 4: a
clear perception) (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg
et al., 2010]. The two tasks were presented in blocks of
five trials (randomized block order), with a preceding text
informing the participant of the upcoming condition, for
example, “You have previously rated the following words
to fit the Danish Queen.” There was no overlap between
the target words in the self and other task, nor with the
forced-choice alternative words (words that the participant
had previously marked as fitting both himself and the
Queen). Each word was used twice and each participant
had an individual number of trials based on their prior
word rating (mean number of trials 77.9, SD 5 17.4). The
forced choice alternatives were matched on length to the
target words. The stimulus duration was fixed at 33 ms,
and the task difficulty was controlled by modifying the
contrast of the presented word, using a two-up-one-down
staircase function [Cornsweet, 1962; Watson and Pelli,
1983] enforcing an accuracy approximating 70.7%. Prior to
the main study, a 5–10 min training round was used to
acquaint the participant with the paradigm and to deter-
mine the initial contrast level. The training consisted of
adjectives not used in the main task.
The paradigm was implemented using the Python-based
package PsychoPy [Peirce, 2008] (version 1.77) on an Intel
Quad-core computer (2.66 GHz, 3.25 GB memory) running
Windows XP and presented on a 19-inch screen (1024 3
768 resolution, 32 bit color depth, 60 Hz refresh rate). It
was verified that the presentation times were exact within
one millisecond using an oscilloscope and a photo sensor.
The experiment took place in a single-person test room,
where the light was kept dimmed (constant across all par-
ticipants) and external noise reduced.
Experiment 2: Extended self-awareness
Forty-two right handed male participants, without a his-
tory of diseases or drugs affecting the brain, participated
in the study. Two participants were excluded, one due to
side effects from the Sinemet (nausea) and one who had
misunderstood the task. The participants were randomly
distributed to two age-matched groups [t(38) 5 0.4577, P
5 0.65]. One group was given 125 mg of Sinemet (mean
age 27.2, SD 5 5.8), and another group was given a pla-
cebo capsule (mean age 26.4, SD 5 5.6).
For each word, participants performed one of three
tasks, one related to retrieval of self-related judgments,
one related to retrieval of other-related judgments, and a
control task during which participants simply reported
whether a presented adjective had an even or odd number
of syllables. The series were presented in counter-balanced
order. The tasks were referred to as “self,” “other,” and
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“syllables” (Fig. 2a). In “self” the participant first rated
how well a given adjective fitted his own personality on a
four-point scale identical to the one described in Experi-
ment 1. Adjectives were presented consecutively on a
screen. The series of adjectives was subsequently repeated
in pseudorandom order ensuring that any word was on
average shown again 5 min later. During the repetition,
the participant was required to retrieve his previous judg-
ment on a two-point scale (word previously judged as
“fitting” vs. not fitting) (Fig. 2a). The changes in presenta-
tion order and required response were introduced to avoid
automatic motor responses. A total of 360 trait adjectives
[Anderson, 1968] were used for each participant, with 40
words in each combination of block and task (matched on
likeableness, word frequency, word length and number of
vowels).
Stimulus words were selected from a list of 555
personality-trait adjectives [Anderson, 1968] that were
translated into Danish, as no similar Danish ranking exists.
Of the full word list, the 360 most frequent Danish adjec-
tives were identified using a Danish corpus (www.ordnet.
dk/korpusdk), and the words were pseudorandomly
divided into nine-word lists based on the English likeable-
ness rating, the Danish word frequency, the number of
characters and the number of vowels. The randomization
was repeated until a one-way ANOVA on each score
showed no significant differences between the word lists
(likeableness, P 5 0.96, frequency, P 5 0.95, word length,
P 5 0.99, and number of vowels, P 5 0.99). The paradigm
was implemented in E-prime (www.pstnet.com/eprime.
cfm), version 2.0. It was run on a desktop computer (Dell
Optiplex 780, 1024 3 768 resolution, 32 bit color depth, 60
Hz refresh rate) and was projected on to a back-projection
screen in the shielded room (using a Panasonic PT-
D10000E projector). The reflective screen was located
approximately 1 m from the participant and all partici-
pants concurred that they could read the text.
MEG Recording and Analysis
In Experiment 2, MEG was recorded throughout the
paradigm. The MEG analysis was performed on the data
recorded during retrieval of episodic memory to obtain a
measure of extended (or narrative) self-awareness, and
during performance of syllable calculations online. Unlike
electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), MEG allows the study of paralimbic
regional activity and interaction on a millisecond timescale
and with decent spatial resolution. Here we measured
regional power in two main nodes of the paralimbic net-
work of self-awareness, medial prefrontal cortex and PCC,
and in a control region, right primary visual cortex (rV1)
(Fig. 2b). The network was identified in a previous PET
study of hemodynamic paralimbic interactions elicited by
extended self-reference [Lou et al., 2004]. Midline Talairach
coordinates of medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate/
medial parietal were measured for identification of targets
for the MEG analysis used in the present study (0, 59, 40;
0, –50, 28; and 0, –38, 8, respectively). The control region
was chosen because this region is anatomically and func-
tionally comparatively separate from the midline regions
investigated.
Communication between regions was investigated by
Granger causality in order to test if it was dependent of
frequency, medication, or whether the interaction between
medial prefrontal cortex and PCC was different from inter-
action between medial prefrontal cortex and the control
region rV1.
The MEG data were recorded using a TRIUX MEG sys-
tem (Elekta Instruments AB, Stockholm, Sweden) with 204
planar gradiometers and 102 magnetometers; electromag-
netic recordings were sampled at 1 kHz using analog fil-
tering of 0.1–330 Hz. Horizontal and vertical eye
movements were recorded bipolarly using surface electro-
des, and a continuous measure of the head position in the
scanner was obtained using five head coils. The data were
coregistered to individual magnetic resonance (MR)
images by registering three landmark points recognizable
on the MR in addition to 501 points marking the head
shape. The structural MR was acquired in a separate ses-
sion on a Siemens 3T MR scanner with a resolution of 1 3
1 3 1 mm.
Using Elekta’s MaxFilter software (Version 2.1), the
head position was transformed to the one initially
recorded. Electromagnetic sources external to the partici-
pant’s head were suppressed based on Maxwell’s equa-
tions and, in addition, sources in the boundary region
were projected out using a temporal extension of the Sig-
nal Space Separation method. A log of the head movement
was inspected, while blinded to the task and medication.
A total of two data blocks (of 120 trials each) were
removed in this process due to excessive movement or
faulty recording of head position. The results of the Max-
Filtering were visually inspected, and artifact-inducing
channels were excluded in an iterative manner. In the
remaining analysis, only planar gradiometers were used.
Using principal component analysis, the dimension of the
data was reduced to 64 components. Subsequent inde-
pendent component analysis (ICA) was used to project out
electrooculography (eye movement), electrocardiography
(heartbeat) artifacts, and flux jumps on sensors. Visual
inspection of all the data verified that this was done suc-
cessfully. The data were epoched into the three tasks (self,
other, syl) with a trial defined as 21000 to 3000 ms relative
to the word onset. The variance of the individual trials
was inspected and trials with excessive variance were
excluded, based on visual inspection while blinded to the
task and group.
Using FieldTrip [Oostenveld et al., 2011], the head shape
was extracted and linearly normalized to a Montreal Neu-
rological Institute (MNI) template in order to generate a
single-shell forward model. This was corrected using the
previously found ICA weights to account for projecting out
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mostly frontal components. With a spatial filter, data were
projected into the brain and time series were extracted from
the prespecified regions of interest (ROIs) for each partici-
pant (medial prefrontal cortex, PCC and rV1).
As Granger causality is sensitive to band-pass filtering
and the sample rate of the data, and to ensure stationarity,
the approach from [Barnett and Seth, 2011] was used. The
data were downsampled to 256 Hz and the beamformer
was used to extract time series for the individual frequen-
cies of interest. With Granger causality, an autoregressive
model of a time series is created, by estimating future val-
ues as a weighted sum of present and previous values. If
the model error of a region A is significantly reduced by
including present or previous values from a different
region B, then region B is said to Granger-cause region A.
Granger-causality was analyzed using the GCCA toolbox
[Seth, 2010]. The model order (number of previous sam-
ples included in the model) was initially sought estimated
using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) [Akaike,
1974] and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [Schwarz,
1978] criteria. Neither of these methods converged, as the
fitting parameter (which was sought minimized) kept
decreasing with increasing model order. This was despite
the penalty term in the model, which penalized model com-
plexity. The problem of estimating the model order is com-
mon in Granger Causality estimates of EEG/MEG source
data (see Barrett et al., 2012; Gow et al., 2008]. A model
order of five was chosen as this is sufficient to account for
the propagation delay between the ROI. It was verified that
results were robust for model orders in the range of 5–20.
Statistics
The R statistical software [R Core Team, 2013] was used
for all statistical analysis.
Experiment 1: With the staircase function used to regulate
the trial difficulty the contrast level of the individual trials
were tightly bound. To model this dependency, a Markov
model was applied. Stationary distributions [Hastings, 1970]
were estimated for each subject using a maximum-likelihood
estimate. Stationary distributions reflect the probability of
each contrast-level for a randomly selected trial X. We could
thus obtain a summary statistic of the (Markov-estimated)
average contrast-level for each participant by summing the
products of the probability for each contrast-level and the
corresponding contrast-value. The Markov estimates were
made using the “markovchain” package [Spedicato, 2014].
Metacognition was modeled using generalized linear
mixed effects regression using a binomial distribution (as
implemented in R-function glmer, Bates et al., 2014]. In
modeling of metacognition it was verified that the
described model performed significantly better than a
model that did not include any interaction between aware-
ness and medication (P 5 0.0289).
Experiment 2: Only retrieval trials (self/other) and sylla-
ble trials (syl) were used for the analysis, that is, encoding
trials were not used. In the analysis of the behavioral data
it was verified that the model was significantly better at
modeling the data than a null model (P 5 0.028).
For the medial prefrontal cortex power findings, it was
verified that the model performed significantly better than
a corresponding null-model (P 5 0.027). For the whole-
brain beamforming, the power (during the 1 s after word
onset) was calculated for each voxel and averaged over tri-
als for each participant (and task). A Monte Carlo simula-
tion with 1000 randomizations of the unpaired t-test was
used to estimate the Z-score for each voxel, when compar-
ing participants given placebo and those given Sinemet.
No correction for multiple comparisons was applied in the
whole-head analysis.
RESULTS
Experiment 1: Minimal Self-Awareness with Noetic
Metacognition
Task difficulty was regulated by increasing and decreas-
ing the contrast of the stimuli to enforce a theoretical accu-
racy of 70.7% on both self-task and other-task. Despite this
staircasing procedure, the accuracy in the dopamine group
was significantly higher than accuracy in the placebo group
(Wilcoxon rank sum test: W 5 860, P 5 0.031), while no dif-
ference in task (self/other) accuracy was found (Wilcoxon
signed rank test: V 5 1491, P 5 0.432). Using contrast as a
measure of task difficulty, we modeled Markov-estimated
average contrast level as a linear response of task (self/other),
medication (dopamine/placebo), and the interaction between
them. An ANOVA revealed no significant effects [F’s(1,136)
< 1.2, P 0.25 for all comparisons]. PAS ratings were split in
two categories: no awareness (PAS response 1) and aware-
ness (PAS response 2–4). Perceptual awareness was examined
using logistic regression (Fixed effects: task and medication.
Random effect: participant), and a significant main effect of
task was found with higher awareness of self-related, com-
pared to other-related words (z5–5.4, P < 0.001). No signifi-
cant main effect of medication was found, and no significant
interactions were found (z< 1 for all comparisons).
Noetic metacognition was examined using logistic regres-
sion with the forced choice response (correct/incorrect) as the
dependent variable (Fixed effects: awareness, medication,
task, awareness 3 task interaction, and awareness 3 medica-
tion interaction. Random effect: participant). The model
revealed significantly improved accuracy for self-reference as
well as other-reference during subjective awareness, and also
improved interaction between medication and awareness,
where medication increased the difference in accuracy
between aware and unaware trials (z5 2.2, P5 0.029) respec-
tively (Fig. 3). No three-way interaction was found between
task, medication and awareness (z5 –0.55, P5 0.585).
Trait adjectives used in the self-task were on average
more likeable than those used to describe the Queen, but
by including likeability as a covariate no change was seen
(Supporting Information).
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We aimed at testing the hypothesis that dopaminergic
stimulation increases the accuracy for a given degree of
awareness, or, in other words, that the subjective experience
of awareness became a better predictor of performance
(noetic metacognition) with dopamine. This was indeed con-
firmed. A more complex signal-detection oriented approach
to analysis could have been chosen as an alternative. We did
attempt this but failed. (see Supporting Information for
details). Our technique using random effects has the advant-
age of naturally handling repeated measures, as well as
allowing standard testing of regression/ANOVA type struc-
tures for the independent variables and their interaction.
The main finding of this experiment was thus a general
increase in noetic metacognition [Frith, 2012; Metcalfe and
Son, 2012] caused by dopamine.
Experiment 2: Extended Self-Awareness with
Autonoetic Metacognition in Explicit Self-Reference
For the behavioral part, we used logistic regression in a
mixed model with response (correct/incorrect) as the
dependent variable (Fixed effects: medication and task.
Random effect: participant). A main effect of task was
found, with fewer errors during the self-task than the
other-task (z5–3.46, P < 0.001). A trend for a main effect
of dopamine was also demonstrated (z 5 1.88, P 5 0.067).
There was a significant interaction between task and medi-
cation (z 5 –2.68, P 5 0.007). Here, dopamine improved
the performance in the self-task more than in the other-
task (Fig. 4a). Concomitantly, there was an increase in
MEG power across all frequency bands in the 5–100 Hz
range in the medial prefrontal cortex (Fig. 4b).
To test if the selectivity of the dopaminergic effect on
the self-task could be due to preferential power increase in
the medial prefrontal region known to selectively instru-
mental in self-evaluation [Luber et al., 2012], we did the
following analyses: (1) Separate analysis of medial prefron-
tal cortex and PCC, which showed that dopaminergic
stimulation significantly increased MEG power in the
medial prefrontal region (linear mixed effect model. Fixed
effect: medication. Random effect: participant: t 5 2.231, P
5 0.026), while power was unchanged in the PCC region
and right V1. (2) Whole head mapping of dopamine-
induced power, which showed an increase in the gamma
frequency range (30–100 Hz), and Z-scores revealed that
the increase was maximal (more than 50%) and significant
(P < 0.05, uncorrected, Monte Carlo simulation of inde-
pendent t-test) throughout the medial prefrontal region
(Fig. 5). Having demonstrated significantly increased
gamma power in the medial prefrontal region, and not in
the posterior region, we wished to visualize a posterior–
anterior trend of dopaminergic effect on gamma power
consonant with the gradient in dopaminergic D1 and D2
receptor concentration [Ko and Strafella, 2012; Lidow
et al., 1991] The results are shown in Figure 5, confirming
our hypothesis of preferential dopamine induced power
increase in medial prefrontal cortex by showing that the
effect of power is only seen in that region (Z > 2, uncor-
rected, deemed adequate for further supporting our
hypothesis). There appeared to be one possible exception,
namely the suggestion that dopaminerergic activation may
also increase gamma power in the right insula. This could,
however, not be concluded from the present study, as cor-
rection for multiple comparisons was required in this case
being not included in our hypothesis. No cortical region
fulfilled that criterion.
A Granger Causality computation showed that the inter-
action between medial prefrontal cortex and PCC was
stronger in gamma frequency band (30–100Hz) than in
lower frequency bands (5–30Hz) (Mixed effect model with
direction and frequency as main effects and medication, id
and trial as nested random effects, t 5 59.58. Including fre-
quency as main effect significantly improved the model
v2(1) 5 3509.1, P < 0.0001).
The main findings in Experiment 2 were thus a
dopamine-induced improved explicit self-awareness with
introspection (autonoetic metacognition), and a
Figure 3.
Effect of dopamine on noetic metacognition (Experiment 1).
Awareness of meaningful stimuli was, as expected, linked to
higher degree of accuracy in forced choice task. This occurred
whether the adjectives were explicitly self-referent or other-
referent (minimal self-awareness). The effect was significantly
enhanced with dopamine, demonstrating increased noetic meta-
cognition [Metcalfe and Son, 2012]. (Estimates from a logistic
regression on accuracy with task, medication, and awareness as
independent variables, Error bars illustrate the 95%-confidence
intervals).
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Figure 4.
Effect of dopamine on explicit self-referent extended self-
awareness and autonoetic metacognition (Experiment 2). (a)
Dopamine caused a significant decrease in error rates for the
“self” condition. Average error rates across participants calcu-
lated within a 15 min window shifted by 30 s (window centered
so a given value in the plot is an average of responses within 6
7.5 min). The plot covers the time interval with data from all
participants. (b) Medial prefrontal cortex power increased by
dopamine across all three experimental tasks and all frequency
bands between 5 and 100Hz, demonstrating increased autono-
etic metacognition [Metcalfe and Son, 2012].
Figure 5.
Distribution of MEG power differences between dopamine and
placebo groups. (a) Increase in power occurs mainly in the
medial prefrontal cortex. The blue cross marks peak location
with 56% increase at the MNI-coordinate (0, 36, 36) mm corre-
sponding to the frontal superior medial region (Found using
AAL atlas, see Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002]. (b) values Z-values
>2 from Monte Carlo simulation of the difference between the
placebo and dopamine group. The slices and blue crosses are
identical to the power plot.
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concomitant preferential power increase in medial prefron-
tal cortex in the gamma range.
DISCUSSION
Overall, the present results demonstrate dopaminergic
regulation of conscious metacognition (self-monitoring). In
experiment 1, dopamine increased the general noetic [Met-
calfe and Son, 2012] metacognitive capacity of the partici-
pants. Metacognitive capacity, in this context, was defined
as the meaningfulness of awareness responses and opera-
tionalized as the relationship between correct responses
and reports of the degree of awareness [Rounis et al.,
2010]. The effect was seen in both categories of adjectives,
whether explicitly related to the self or other. This indi-
cates a general effect on noetic metacognition, as all stim-
uli were implicitly relevant to the self by constructing
meaningful words (i.e., minimal self-awareness) [Kjaer
et al., 2001; Lou et al., 2011c]. In Experiment 2, self-
awareness, as evidenced by correct retrieval of self-
judgments, was increased by dopaminergic stimulation
(autonoetic metacognition, Metcalfe and Son, 2012]. Maxi-
mal electromagnetic effect of dopaminergic stimulation
was seen in the medial prefrontal cortex independent on
task, in agreement with the cortical distribution of dopa-
minergic receptors [Ko and Strafella, 2012; Lidow et al.,
1991]. Given that electromagnetic activity specifically in
medial prefrontal cortex is instrumental in self-evaluation
[Luber et al., 2012], this specific distribution of dopamine
effect on power explains its specific effect on extended
self-awareness. While several electrophysiological and vol-
umetric studies have found that first-order perceptual
awareness correlates primarily with ventral stream activity
in the visual and temporal cortices [Fleming et al., 2010;
Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010; Petrides and Pandya, 2007;
Sandberg et al., 2013], one study using Transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) has found dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex to be instrumental in metacognition [Rounis et al.,
2010]. Interestingly, dorsolateral prefrontal activity is
tightly linked to regulation of dopamine release in the
medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in several
human and animal studies. The impact on metacognition
of TMS over this area by may therefore have been a direct
modulation of the adjacent medial prefrontal region.
The effect of dopamine on noetic metacognition and
extended self-awareness with autonoetic metacognition
may, hypothetically, be linked to other functions associ-
ated with the medial prefrontal region. Dopaminergic
stimulation is, for instance, known to improve motivation
to obtain rewards in animals [Berridge and Kringelbach,
2008; Ward et al., 2012] and humans [Wardle et al., 2011]
by stimulating a neural system that attributes incentive
salience to reward cues. This system primarily consists of
mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic neurons that connect the
ventral tegmental area with the nucleus accumbens, neo-
striatum, amygdala, ventral pallidum and prefrontal cortex
[Robinson et al., 2013]. A main function of this system is
to transform ordinary stimuli, such as cues associated with
rewards, into incentive stimuli, that is, making them
‘attractive’ and able to trigger an urge to pursue and con-
sume their reward [Robinson et al., 2013].
A link between subjective awareness and reward would
be expected if the main cognitive function of awareness is
to make adaptive control of behavior possible, a widely
held belief [Cleeremans, 2011]. Expectation of reward
therefore predicts both awareness and performance. A link
between reward and awareness is further suggested by
the overlap between the paralimbic reward system and the
paralimbic network of self-awareness, since both include
orbito-frontal, medial prefrontal, posterior cingulate/
medial parietal regions and striatum [Kjaer et al., 2001,
2002b; Liu et al., 2011; Lou et al., 2004; Newen and Voge-
ley, 2003]. Also direct evidence has demonstrated the link
between reward maximization and human detection
behavior and confidence, with confidence used as a mea-
sure of awareness [Navalpakkam et al., 2009]. The primary
function of medial prefrontal cortex in the regulation of
the paralimbic network is also consistent with its role in
metacognition [Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith, 2012].
A close association between the networks of mood and
conscious experience has been demonstrated in both psy-
chophysical studies [Barros et al., 2001; Wise and Bozarth,
1985] and by their common local field potentials obtained
from the anterior cingulate cortex with an electrode
implanted for deep brain stimulation therapy [Rømer
Thomsen et al., 2011]. The close interaction between
reward and conscious experience is also supported by
behavioral findings of improved conscious reportability
with positive compared to negative and neutral stimuli
[Rømer Thomsen et al., 2011]. It is interesting that dopa-
mine and the neuropeptide oxytocin have been shown to
interact in reward processing in rodents [Baracz and Cor-
nish, 2013] and that oxytocin influences centro-frontal
event potentials elicited by judgment of personal traits of
oneself differently from a control person, suggesting oxy-
tocin influence on self-awareness [Liu et al., 2013].
There are other hypothetical possibilities which should
also be taken into account. Dopamine has consistently
been shown to improve working memory [e.g., Moran
et al., 2011]. Recently, it has been demonstrated that epi-
sodic memory that persists for several hours is modulated
by dopamine, possibly due to dopamine activation of hip-
pocampal protein synthesis [Chowdhury et al., 2012].
Therefore, working memory enhancement could hypotheti-
cally offer an explanation of the effect of dopaminergic
stimulation on self-awareness. However, it is difficult to
see how this would explain the effect on retrieval of self-
judgment but not other-judgment.
With respect to the possible involvement of attention in
regulation of self-awareness, it is important to realize that in
order to have an effect on conscious experience, dopaminer-
gic release must occur early in sensory processing [Lou
et al., 2011c]. This has been demonstrated in a series of
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investigations: The midbrain superior colliculus is a primary
visual structure, specialized for the detection of rewarding
[Comoli et al., 2003], unexpected [Dommett et al., 2005], and
salient visual stimuli [Redgrave et al., 1999]. It is reached
directly by visual pathways and has direct connections to
the substantia nigra pars compacta, the origin of nigro-
striatal fibers innervating the striatum and limbic structures
[Dommett et al., 2005]. The latency of this circuitry is very
short, approximately 100 ms. In this time, dopaminergic
neurons respond to a salient visual event even before the
onset of a visual saccade, and before the stimulus is in focus
[Redgrave et al., 1999]. The effect of the activity in the cir-
cuitry is therefore pre-attentive. In other words: Salience
and conscious experience precedes attention.
Present literature indicates that self-awareness is linked not
only to activity in medial prefrontal/anterior cingulate cortex
(for review, see Amodio and Frith, 2006] but also to activity in
precuneus/medial parietal cortex and adjacent paralimbic
structures [Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Lou et al., 2011b]. This
paralimbic network of self-awareness is often termed “default
mode network” due to the fact that its activity is reduced
when focusing on external events [Raichle et al., 2001].
TMS has shown that this region is instrumental in self-
enhancement processing, that is the preference of process-
ing self-related stimuli and memories when compared to
other [Luber et al., 2012]. While self-processing is specifi-
cally reduced with TMS in these experiments targeting the
medial prefrontal region specifically, we have shown in
the present Experiment 2 that stimulating this region with
dopamine results in specific enhancement of self-
processing when compared to the processing of other.
In other words, it has now been established that self-
processing in the medial pre-frontal region may be either
reduced or enhanced by electromagnetic or molecular
manipulation. Furthermore, the granger causality analysis
shows a causal interaction between the medial prefrontal
region and the posterior cingulate/medial parietal region,
the latter being instrumental in retrieval of self-related
information [Lou et al., 2004].
CONCLUSION
Dopamine improved the prediction by subjective aware-
ness of objective performance in an online task with mini-
mal self-awareness (noetic metacognition). Dopamine also
enhanced extended self-awareness with introspection
(autonoetic metacognition) concomitant with stimulation
of the anterior cingulate/prefrontal cortex, a process which
seems to be tightly linked to incentive stimulation and
reward. We speculate that this mechanism may be funda-
mental for optimal resource allocation not only for the
individual, but also in its interaction with others, as repor-
tablity is inherent in the way awareness is operationalized
[e.g., Lou et al., 2011c; Rømer Thomsen et al., 2011].
Given the prevalence and severity of disorders of con-
scious self-monitoring, like addiction, ADHD, autism, bor-
derline personality disorder, and so on, it is of prime
importance to understand the pathophysiology. The dis-
covery of dopaminergic regulation of self-awareness indi-
cates the possibility of pharmacological treatment and up-
regulation of dopaminergic receptors by training [e.g.,
McNab et al., 2009] not only in ADHD, but also in the
related disorders.
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